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of proof on this issue, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Matthew had a
FAPE after his IEP program was implemented.
Because the court found that Matthew was not receiving a FAPE at
the time he was hospitalized, the court next examined the issue of whether
the Tices' placement of Matthew in Roanoke Valley Psychiatric Center and
in the Blue Ridge Center properly served to meet the Act's educational
goals. The Fourth Circuit found the record to be factually inadequate for
a determination of whether the placement was proper. However, the court
remanded this issue to the district court for further consideration because
the district court's previous finding on the issue was based upon two
incorrect premises. First, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court
had incorrectly based its finding on the fact that Matthew was hospitalized
while he received educational instruction. The Fourth Circuit found this
premise to be incorrect because the Act's definition of special education
expressly includes instruction in hospitals and institutions. Second, the
Fourth Circuit found that the district court incorrectly deferred to the
judgment of the educational authorities before the authorities had developed
an IEP. The Fourth Circuit stated that at the time of Matthew's hospitalization, the School Board had made no professional decision regarding a
proper IEP. Therefore, the School Board had not made a decision to which
deference was due.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Tice developed a test for determining
whether a handicapped child was entitled to reimbursement for medical
expenses under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
The court held that parties claiming reimbursement under the Act must
prove two conditions before obtaining reimbursement for a child's educational expenses during hospitalization. First, the party requesting reimbursement must show that the child was not receiving a FAPE when the hospital
renders educational services. Second, the party requesting reimbursement
must prove that the child's placement was proper under the Act. If the
party requesting reimbursement can meet this burden of proof, then the
party is entitled to reimbursement to the extent that the expenses incurred
during the hospitalization ,were incurred for educational services. The Eleventh Circuit followed the Tice decision in Doe v. Alabama State Dep't of
Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 662 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit in Doe,
like the Fourth Circuit in Tice, deferred to the educational expertise of the
school board after an IEP was already in place.
SEciUtIsms LAW

Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 77e (1990)
(section 5), requires a person to file a registration statement for all securities
and makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to sell or
deliver after sale an unregistered security. Section 12 of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 771 (1990) (section 12), provides civil liabilities
for violations of section 5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78j (1990) (section 10(b)), makes it unlawful for
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any person, directly or indirectly, to use any manipulative or deceptive
device in selling an unregistered security that violates rules or regulations
that the Commission may promulgate. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (rule lOb-5), makes it unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, to defraud any person. Section 20 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78t(a) (1990) (section 20), makes any person who,
directly or indirectly, controls another person liable under any provision of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 jointly and severally liable with the
controlled person unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the violation or cause of action.
In Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered consolidated appeals
involving claims of securities law violations of section 5, section 12, section
10(b), and rule lob-5 arising from the sale of real estate partnership interests.
In addition to the federal securities claims, the Fourth Circuit considered
claims involving violations of North Carolina securities law, common law
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional and ordinary negligence.
James Bradley (Bradley) owned an option on certain real estate bordering
Lake Lanier in Dawson County, Georgia, secured by a $30,000 nonrefundable deposit. Bradley approached William Jordan (Jordan), a broker for
Interstate Securities Corporation (Interstate), about financing arrangements
available through Interstate. On the basis of this inquiry, Bradley forfeited
his option on the Lake Lanier property and the $30,000 nonrefundable
deposit and entered into a new purchase contract for the property requiring
a $330,000 nonrefundable deposit and a purchase price balance of $3.3
million with financing handled through Interstate.
Jordan, knowing that Interstate did not handle property development
deals, attempted to arrange the financing through several of his Interstate
clients. Jordan represented to these clients that Dawson Realty, a limited
partnership of which he and Bradley were general partners, owned the Lake
Lanier property, and that he was selling limited partnership units to raise
funds needed as cash collateral on a loan. On this basis, three of Jordan's
clients, Arthur Hunt (Hunt), Edgar Ramsey (Ramsey), and Manual Woodworker's, Inc. (Woodworker's), purchased five partnership units totalling
$400,000, and Jordan claimed that a mortgage on a portion of the Lake
Lanier property secured these limited partnership units. Jordan transferred
these proceeds to the owner of the Lake Lanier property to cover the
nonrefundable $330,000 deposit.
When Jordan was unable to obtain sufficient funds to cover the remaining purchase price, the entire deal collapsed with Hunt, Ramsey, and
Woodworker's losing their entire investment. Subsequently, Hunt, Ramsey,
and Woodworker's sued Jordan, Bradley, and Interstate, alleging federal
securities law violations. Bradley cross-claimed against Jordan and Interstate.
Hunt, Ramsey, and Woodworker's also sued Michael Miller, the attorney
that Jordan hired for the Dawson Realty project. Miller acted as the attorney
for all Dawson Realty transactions, and on two separate occasions Miller
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advised both Ramsey and Woodworker's that the Dawson property represented a good deal. When Miller learned that Jordan did not have the
funds to proceed with the project, Miller notified Hunt, Ramsey, and
Woodworker's that they may have been defrauded.
After a three week trial, the district court submitted special interrogatories to the jury. The jury found Jordan liable for selling unregistered
securities and for securities fraud, and the jury found Miller professionally
negligent. As for Interstate, the jury determined the following: that Interstate
was a controlling person within the meaning of section 20; that Interstate
had failed to properly supervise Jordan; that in his dealings, Jordan acted
in the same manner as that authorized by Interstate and within the scope
of his apparent authority as an Interstate employee. As for Bradley, the
jury found him not liable for the investor's losses and found that Jordan
had committed a fraud against Bradley. The jury also returned punitive
damages awards for the investors and Bradley in the special verdict. Based
on the jury's special verdict the district court entered judgment awarding
compensatory damages of $400,000 to Hunt, Ramsey, and Woodworker's
and $30,000 to Bradley. The district court held that Jordan, Miller, and
Interstate were jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages.
However, the district court held that Miller was not jointly and severally
liable for the $30,000 to Bradley and for $160,000 to Hunt and Ramsey
because Miller was not involved in the initial Dawson Realty transactions.
The district court also entered judgment on the punitive damages holding
Jordan and Interstate jointly and severally liable for $320,000 to Woodworker's, $480,000 to Hunt and Ramsey, and $70,000 to Bradley. Additionally, the district court ordered Jordan and Interstate to pay the attorney
fees for Hunt, Ramsey, and Woodworker's. Interstate and Miller appealed
the district court's judgement.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first addressed the district court's denial
of Interstate's motion for a directed verdict. Interstate had moved for a
directed verdict in its favor claiming that Interstate was not liable to the
investors because the investors knew that Interstate was not involved in the
deal. On the basis of Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir. 1987),
the Fourth Circuit refused to disturb the district court's ruling unless the
Fourth Circuit concluded that on the evidence presented, without weighing
the evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses, a reasonable jury
could have returned a verdict only for the defendants. After reviewing the
record, the Fourth Circuit found that abundant evidence existed to support
the district court's' decision not to direct a verdict for Interstate and to
support the subsequent verdict by the jury. The record showed that Jordan
was an employee and representative of Interstate during the entire transaction, and that Jordan performed all of his dealings from his Interstate
office. Furthermore, in at least one instance, Jordan transferred money
from an existing Interstate account to pay for a limited partnership unit,
and the managers responsible for monitoring all Interstate transactions never
questioned the appearance of this transaction on Interstate's books despite
their admission that they had to supervise Jordan more than any other
Interstate employee.
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Interstate next asserted that under Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), it was entitled
to a new trial because of an omission from the jury instructions. In
Carpenter the Fourth Circuit held that a controlling person may avoid
liability under section 20 by having in place an adequate system of internal
control and by maintaining the system in a diligent manner. Based on
Carpenter,Interstate contended that the district court should have instructed
the jury to find Interstate liable only if the jury believed that Interstate
culpably participated in the transaction. Reviewing this claim, the Fourth
Circuit stated that Interstate misread the holding in Carpenter as requiring
a finding of culpable negligence, and the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court's jury instruction adequately tracked the holding in Carpenter. The
district court's jury instruction asked the jury to determine if Interstate
took adequate precautionary measures to prevent an employee from causing
an injury, supervised Interstate employees in an adequate and reasonable
fashion, and maintained this system in a diligent manner. Interstate also
claimed that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on the
possible contributory negligence of the investors. The Fourth Circuit concluded that this omission was harmless error because the verdict against
Interstate rested on multiple theories of liability.
Interstate also appealed the district court's award of punitive damages
to the investors and Bradley. The Fourth Circuit upheld the punitive damage
award on the basis of the plaintiffs' common law claims rather than their
securities claims because punitive damages are unavailable under federal
securities law claims. In Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259-60 (4th Cir.
1975), the Fourth Circuit held that section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78bb(a) (1990), forecloses punitive damages
in a rule lOb-5 action.
As for the remaining issues on appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
award of attorney's fees under section 78A-56(a)(2) of the North Carolina
Securities Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. section 78A-56(a)(2) (1990). Section 78A56(c) of the North Carolina Securities Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. section 78A56(c) (1990) (section 78A-56(c)), provides an affirmative defense against the
award of attorney's fees if the controlling person proves that they did not
know of the facts giving rise to liability. Interstate claimed that they
sustained the burden of proof required to invoke the affirmative defense
that section 78A-56(c) provides. The Fourth Circuit held that under Walker
v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1065 (1987), Interstate could not invoke the defense on appeal because
Interstate failed to plead the defense and did not submit the defense to the
jury in the special interrogatories at trial. As for Miller, the Fourth Circuit
agreed that the district court erred in omitting a jury instruction about
Miller's contributory negligence defense. The Fourth Circuit, relying on
United Leasing v. Miller, 60 N.C. App. 40, 44-54, 298 S.E.2d 409, 412-18
(1982), rev. denied, 308 N.C. 194, 302 S.E.2d 248 (1983), concluded that
North Carolina law recognizes contributory negligence as a defense to
professional negligence. Weighing the evidence in the record in the light
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most favorable to Miller, the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence reasonably supported an inference of contributory negligence. Because the district
court failed to admit the appropriate instruction, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the judgement against Miller and remanded for a new trial as to Miller.
To obtain federal question jurisdiction under the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. section 77 et. seq. and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. section 78 et.seq., a plaintiff's claim must involve a security. Under
both acts, an investment contract qualifies as a security. In SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-299 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a
contract is an investment contract whenever a "person [1] invests his money
[2] in a common enterprise [31 and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party..
. ." The third prong of the
Howey test refers to the degree of control an investor has over the investment
enterprise. Because the Supreme Court did not clearly articulate in Howey
whether courts should determine control by looking only to the terms of
the contract or by also looking to outside circumstances, courts have had
66
difficulty applying the third prong of the Howey test.'
In Bailey v. J. W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990), the
Fourth Circuit examined whether, under the third prong of the Howey test,
only the language of the contract or the actual circumstances surrounding
the contract are determinative of the type of control an investor has over
an investment enterprise. The Fourth Circuit recognized that when considering either the contract or the circumstances surrounding the contract, the
examining court must determine if the investor actually had control over
the profitability of the enterprise. If an investor has control over the
profitability of the enterprise, the investor does not have an investment
contract. Consequently, the investor does not have a security and, therefore,
will have no cause of action under the Securities Act of 1933 or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The events leading to this appeal began when the plaintiffs, individual
businessmen, entered into two contracts with the defendant regarding the
defendant's cattle breeding program. In the first contract, the plaintiffs
agreed to purchase cattle embryos from the defendant. The contract provided
that the plaintiffs could select their own embryos. In the second contract,
the defendant agreed to care for and market the cattle produced by the
embryos. This agreement provided that the plaintiffs could direct the care
of the cattle and could terminate the agreement at any time. The plaintiffs
relied upon the defendant to select embryos suitable for crossbreeding and
to crossbreed the resultant cattle. The plaintiffs expected to earn a profit
166. See Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988)
(stating that courts should not always literally construe the Supreme Court's Howey test); SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973) (considering whether to adopt a narrow or broad construction of Howey test); Waterman
v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006
(4th Cir. 1987) (deciding to consider surrounding circumstances of investment to determine if
investment contract was involved).
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by developing a crossbreed of cattle and selling the embryos of the new
crossbred cattle.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant abandoned the breeding program due to unfavorable changes in the tax laws. The plaintiffs further
alleged that the defendant made inadequate disclosures concerning the cattle
breeding program in violation of federal securities laws. The defendant
moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim under the federal
securities laws, arguing that the cattle breeding contracts were not investment
contracts or any other type of security. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia appointed a magistrate to conduct
discovery on the issue of whether the plaintiffs' contracts with the defendant
qualified as securities. The magistrate found that the contracts were an
investment in a common enterprise, satisfying the first two prongs of the
Howey test. Under the third prong of the Howey test, however, the
magistrate determined that the plaintiffs did not expect profits solely from
the efforts of the defendant. The magistrate held that, according to the
language of the contract, plaintiffs had the authority to exercise control
over their investments. The magistrate determined, therefore, that the plaintiffs did not expect profits solely from the efforts of the defendant.
Consequently, the magistrate held that the plaintiffs had no investment
contract and no claim under the federal securities laws. The district court
adopted the magistrate's views and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, arguing that they had no control over the profitability
of the investment enterprise because circumstances surrounding the agreements effectively prevented them from exercising control.
To resolve the dispute, the Fourth Circuit looked to the purpose of the
federal securities laws and to the language of the Supreme Court's decision
in Howey. The Fourth Circuit found that one of the primary goals of the
federal securities laws is to protect investors through full disclosure of the
information investors need to make informed decisions. In Howey the
Supfeme Court recognized that investors who do not have control over their
investments need "full and fair disclosure" more than investors who are
able to control their investments. The Supreme Court further stated in
Howey that an investment contract "embodies a flexible rather than static
principle," and that in determining whether an investment contract exists a
court should consider "economic reality" over form. Thus, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the three pronged Howey test allows courts to
consider the practicalities and realities of the contractual relationship in
addition to the language of the contract.
The Fourth Circuit further supported its decision to consider the surrounding circumstances of an agreement by distinguishing Bailey from
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th
Cir. 1988), in which the Fourth Circuit held that certain partnership interests
were not investment contracts. In Rivanna a partnership agreement allowed
the general partners to exercise majority control, and the Fourth Circuit
found that the partners did in fact exercise their authority. The Fourth
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Circuit determined that in Bailey, however, the investors acted as individuals
and, although the investors possessed authority under the contract to control
their investments, the investors did not exercise their authority.
After distinguishing Bailey from Rivanna, the Fourth Circuit then
examined whether the plaintiffs could have, but chose not to, exercise their
authority. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs were experienced
businessmen and had the knowledge to raise and sell cattle for slaughter.
The Fourth Circuit found, however, that the plaintiffs had no expertise in
selecting embryos for a cattle breeding program or in managing a cattle
breeding program. The defendant, on the other hand, had the special
expertise needed to select embryos which would produce maximum profits.
This fact tended to make the plaintiffs rely heavily on the defendant's
expertise. According to the Fourth Circuit, another limitation on plaintiffs'
control over the enterprise was the lack of available alternatives. The
plaintiffs stated that they would have had to travel to Texas to find a
breeding program similar to the defendant's. The Fourth Circuit also found
that plaintiffs had limited control over their investment because of the
interdependence present in a cattle crossbreeding program. That is, because
no single investor owned enough cattle to manage his own breeding program,
the program required coordination by one entity. The only available organizer was the defendant, Albemarle Farms. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that because of plaintiffs' lack of experience and expertise, the lack of
readily available alternative sources, the need for one entity to coordinate
the cattle breeding program, and the circumstance that plaintiffs acted as
individuals, that plaintiffs were not realistically able to exercise the authority
granted by the agreements. The Fourth Circuit determined, therefore, that
the agreements qualified as investment contracts and that the defendant's
motion to dismiss should not have been granted.
In Bailey the Fourth Circuit held that courts should consider the realities
limiting plaintiffs control over investments in determining whether an agreement is an investment contract. Following its decision in Bailey, the Fourth
Circuit is in agreement with the Ninth Circuit regarding consideration of
the circumstances surrounding a contract to determine the degree of control
an investor exercises over his investments. 67 Both circuits have held that
courts should look to surrounding circumstances to determine whether
investors could in fact exercise control over their investments. The Fourth
Circuit's Bailey decision discourages investors from passively letting third
parties make decisions by requiring investors to prove that circumstances
effectively precluded them from exercising their authority before the court
will find that an investment contract existed. The Bailey decision also
circumvents the prospect that investment promoters could limit their disclosure obligations through skillful contract drafting.

167. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973) (adopting a broad interpretation of Howey test).

